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WHAT MILITARY CRIMINAL LAW CAN TEACH US:
A UNITED STATES PERSPECTIVE
Donald N. Zillman'
A quarter century ago, any comparative criminal law in the United States tended
to treat the federal criminal justice system as the model for other systems (state,
military, Indian tribal). The fifty state systems handled the vast majority of
criminal cases. They were reforming both their adherence to federal constitutional
protections for the accused and their administrative organization. Criminal justice
had become a large volume business and old "horse and buggy'' practices could
not keep up with the workload.
Military criminal law, vintage 1967, seemed even more behind the times.
Several of the perceived essentials of modern criminal justice were missing from
the military system. The protections of the American Bill of Rights1 were applied
haphazardly. The growing unpopularity of the Vietnam War was thoroughly
colouring all judgments of military criminal law. Comparative studies of military
law and federal civilian criminal law focused on how the military system could
become more like the civilian. The whole could be summed up as the title of a
popular book, "Military Justice is to Justice as Military Music is to Music."
A quarter century later, comparative study is much more fruitful and balanced.
The civilian justice system in the United States (federal or state) is no longer the
ideal to be blindly emulated. The military justice system has changed, and it has
many valuable insights to offer the other criminal systems in Canada and the
United States.
Military law in the United States is older than the Constitution. 2 One of the
frrst acts of the Continental Congress was the adoption of the British Articles of
War to govern the new Continental Army.3 The Constitution of 1787 recognized
that the new Congress had the power to "make rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces.'"' This provision clearly envisioned that
one set of those rules would be a criminal code to govern the armed forces.
Congress enacted separate codes for the Army and Navy and periodically renewed
them over the next 150 years. American military criminal jurisprudence grew out

'Dean and Edward Godfrey Professor, University of Maine School of Law. Dean Zillman served
briefly as a public defender and on the staff of the Arizona Attorney-General's office. He has four
years of active service in the Army Judge Advocate General's Corps and ten years of reserve duty.
1

United States Constitution, Bill of Rights, U.S.C.S. Constitution, Amendment 9.

2

United States Constitution, U.S.C.S. Constitution, Art. I-VII [hereinafter Constitution].

3Diary

of Congress, Journals of the Continental Congress (1905), val. 2 at 111 (30 June 1nS).

4

Art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
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of these codes and the regulations, judicial decisions and expert commentary which
followed.
Following World War ll, military criminal law underwent one of its greatest
transformations. In line with the consolidation of all armed forces into the
Department of Defence, Congress adopted a Unifonn Code of Military Justice. 5
The same criminal statutes would govern soldiers, sailors, marines, and Air Force
personnel.6 The new Code also made the military one more like civilian criminal
codes than had previously been the case. The major changes were in criminal
procedure rather than in the definition of criminal acts. As to the latter, the Code
continued the prior practice of punishing both common criminal acts (homicide,
robbery, rape, etc.) and distinctly military crimes (disobedience of orders, mutiny,
sleeping on guard duty, hazarding a vessel and so forth) .

.

A major change from old codes to the new UCMJ was the lessening of the
criminal justice system as an instrument of the military command. American
military justice and virtually any military justice system struggles with the
appropriate role of the commander. On the one hand, criminal misconduct in
general and the performance of the individual soldier or sailor in the specific, are
matters of great concern to the military commander. Command is the effective
use of personnel to achieve the military mission. The military commander bears
far more direct responsibility for the failure of subordinates than almost any other
leader in society. The captain whose ship runs aground or the brigade commander
whose unit is ambushed, gains little sympathy by claiming that subordinates
"screwed up." He or she will be reminded, in no uncertain terms, that it is the
commander's job to see that subordinates do not "screw up." Under these
circumstances, it is not unusual that a commander's instinct is to be concerned
about any criminal misconduct among the troops under his or her command. This
concern can extend to such essentials as determining if the accused committed the
criminal act and the appropriate punishment. At the extreme, this could make the
commander (often acting through subordinates), investigating officer, prosecutor,
judge, jury, and corrections officer.
At the other extreme is the system in which military command is totally
removed from the accused during the criminal process. In this system, federal
civilian prosecutors, judges, and juries would investigate and adjudicate the
criminal offence. Alternatively, the military criminal law system could remove the
commander from the process replacing him or her with independent military
prosecutors, defence counsel, and· judges. The criminal investigation and

1b.e Uniform Code of Military Justice is codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801-940 (1992) [hereinafter UCMJ).
6

Laws of the United States, c. 169, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 64 Statutes at Large 107 et seq. (1950).
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adjudication would proceed with the soldier's commander as no more than an
interested by-stander.
The objection to command control has been the lack of fairness to the
individual accused. The widespread exposure of once-and-future civilians to
military justice during World War II doomed excessive command involvement.
The UCMJ and its amendments in 1968 created a model that moved in the
direction of greater individual rights to the accused at the expense of command
control. The system that exists in 1992 continues to give the( commander 'powers
over the criminal process, significantly the ability to bring a criminal prosecution
and define some of the terms under which it shall be adjudicated. It provides
military defence counsel and judges, at the trial and appellate levels, with almost
full independence of the accused's military commander. Also, it provides specific
prohibitions of things a commander may not do to prejudice the judicial process.
While the names and procedures· may be different,· the current military felony trial
would be easily recognizable to anyone familiar with Anglo-American criminal
jurisprudence.
The process begins with the filing of charges, typically by the victim, the
commander of the accused, or a military police official.7 The charges are acted
upon by a military commander who performs some of the functions of the civilian
prosecutor.8 The more serious the offence,· the more high ranking the
commander who may convene the court-martial.9 At the felony level, the
commander is typically a general officer and often the commander of the
installation. The commander, after investigation, has the civilian prosecutor's
range of options including the following: dismissing the charges, referring the
matter to a higher level of command, or initiating court-martial proceedings. 10
While the commander is the statutorily responsible officer, much of the actual
processing of charges and the recommendations to prosecute come from the
commander's legal staff.u
Unless the parties request trial by military judge alone, the commander will
convene the court-martial by. appointing a military judge, trial [prosecution] and

7

.

UCMJ, Art. 30, 10 U.S.C. § 830.

UCMJ, Arts. 32-35, 10 u.s.c. §§ 832-35 require the investigation of charges before submission to a
general court-martial, the legal advice of the staff judge advocate, and the service of charges on the
accused.
8

UCMJ, Arts. 22-24, 10 U.S.C. §§ 822-24. Se~ also, UCMJ, Arts. 18-20, 10 U.S.C. §§ 818-20 which spell
out the jurisdiction of general, special, and summary courts-martial.

9

10

Rules for Courts-Martial 401, Manual for Courts-Martial, 11-33 (1984). The President's power to
prescribe court-martial rules is spelled out in UCMJ, Art. 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836.
11

Attorney members of the Judge Advocate General's Corps.
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defence counsel, and by naming members of the court. 12 In current practice,
both the. judge and the defence counsel are members of separate command
structures from the convening authority. The goal is to avoid even the appearance
of prejudice to the defendant.
The court-martial proceeds like the civilian trial. The defendant may plead
guilty, typically by means of a plea bargain, 13 the prosecution and defence put
forth their evidence and witnesses are examined and cross-examined.
Constitutional rules regarding search and seizure and statements of the accused
are applicable. At the conclusion, the fact finder reaches a judgment as to
whether the charges are proven.14 If they are, he or she then sets the appropriate
penalty. Following the completion of the court-martial, the convening officer may
modify the punishment in favour of the accused or remit it altogether .15 In this
situation, the commander has a clemency power similar to that of a state governor,
which can be exercised for a good reason or for no reason at all. 16
After command review of the court-martial is complete, and if the accused's
conviction stands, the appellate process begins. The seriousness of the fmdings
determines the appeal process. Where the sentence is discharge from the service
or imprisonment for one year or more, the accused is guaranteed reassessment at
the Court of Military Review of his/her serviceP The Courts of Military Review
are usually composed of senior military legal officers. Typically, the defendant will
be represented by new counsel who specializes in appellate criminal work.
A further discretionary review is available from the "Supreme Court of the
Military." This is the United States Court of Military Appeals created in the
UCM/. 18 By statutory requirement, the members of the Court of Military
Appeals are civilians, not uniformed military members. The sceptic of military
justice will probably be disappointed to fmd much similarity between civilian and
military criminal law. Yet points of difference do exist and an examination of
these points will provide valuable lessons to the civilian justice system.

12

UCMJ, Arts. 25-27, 10 U.S.C. §§ 825-27.

13

Rules for Couns-Manial910, Manual for Couns-Manial, 11-117.

14

UCMJ, Arts. 51-52, 10 U.S.C. §§ 851-52.

15ucMJ,

Art. 60, 10 u.s.c. § 860.

16

/bid. at 60(c)(l), 10 U.S.C. § 860, "The authority under this section to modify the findings and
sentence...is a matter of command prerogative involving the sole direction of the convening authority."
17

UCMJ, Art. 66, 10 U.S.C. § 866.

18

Art. 67, 10

u.s.c. § 867.
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The military criminal law experience over the last 20 years offers some usefj.Il
bases of comparison with civilian criminal justice. In general, military justice has
grown in popular esteem, while civilian criminal law has been ·increasingly
criticized. Military justice has generally benefitted from the reforms of the
Vietnam era. The full recognition of the military judge and the independence of
defence counsel from command influence, have removed two of the perceived
deficiencies of the old system. The continued improvement of the military
appellate system has allowed for the correction of inevitable trial errors. Also, the
development of an all-volunteer force, with high entry and retention standards, has
ended some of the problems created by including unproductive and unmilitary
persons in the ranks.
Assessment of any criminal justice system can be based on a number of
questions which measure of performance. Among them are the following:
Does the system accurately assess guilt?
Does the system provide the accused with the rights promised to even the
guilty person under the Constitution and laws?
Does the system provide appropriate support for victims and others harmed
by criminal activity?
'
Does the system encourage the correction of the convicted criminal?
Does the system achieve its objectives with the most efficient expenditure of
public wealth?
I cannot answer these questions with certainty. However, I will present some
features of the military criminal justice system which provide potential answers
deserving study by the reformers of civilian systems.
The first feature is the involvement of the commander. While reforms have
properly removed the commander from involvement with individual guilt
determinations, military criminal law remains commander-focused. He or she
convenes the proceedings, receives reports from the legal and police experts about
the state of wrongdoing in the command, and exercises a considerable post
conviction clemency power.
The civilian system has no equivalent to the conmander. The prosecuting
attorney is in a largely adversarial role with the accused. The mayor or governor
offers little that makes him or her the employer-supervisor figure. Typically, the
politician's role is to rail against crime rather than to undertake serious efforts to
control it. The civilian structure of government may place much of the
responsibility for crime and punishment on attorneys general and district attorneys
who are independent from the mayor or governor of their jurisdictions (or even
of a separate political party). Civilian responsibility for crime is thus fragmented.
With everyone to blame, there is no one to blame.
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The second feature is the specialized nature of the criminal legal profession
in the military. At the larger installations criminal work is handled by criminal
justice professionals. The prosecutor and the defence counsel are equivalent to
civilian district attorneys and public defenders. Criminal law is their primary or
entire workload. The generalist handling the occasional criminal case is largely
absent from the military. As well, the military judge is a criminal specialist, not
a judicial generalist. The military has no separate judicial control over non
criminal matters as is common in civilian spheres. The military judge is drawn
from the ranks of military criminal lawyers. Judgeship becomes the next and often
final stage of a military professional career that may take the officer to his or her
fifties or sixties. A new military judge is often younger than his or her civilian
counterpart, but rarely comes to the bench without substantial familiarity with
criminal law and practice. The new civilian jurist may reach the bench without any
exposure to criminal practice. The military judge may also fmd greater incentives
towards a career in judging than the civilian. The military jurist does not face re
elections or wages well below that of some civilian contemporaries.
Professionalization extends to the military appellate process as well. The work
of the "Supreme Court of the Military'' is solely criminal. Appeals are automatic
and experienced appellate counsel are available to challenge any failings of the
defence counsel. The military jurists of the Courts of Military Review come to
their appellate assignment with considerable criminal justice experience. Civilian
judges of the Court of Military Appeals without such experience fmd it soon
develops.
A third feature of the military justice system involves the treatment of the
victim. In recent decades, civilian criminal law has begun to recognize that crime
victims may be damaged by the legal system after they have been damaged by the
criminal. Civilian efforts to improve the situation have been sporadic and often
thwarted by budgetary and constitutional considerations. The military may do
better. While the UCMJ provides no victims' rights section, the structure of the
military is likely to give support and comfort to a victim who is a military member
or dependent. Free medical and counselling care· is available. Military claims
statutes may recompense some criminal harms. Lastly, the military community is
likely to side frrmly with the victim.
A fourth feature of the military justice system is its potential for rehabilitation
of the convicted. The civilian "corrections systems" appear to be doing little
correction. The system has little to ·offer ·the convict who truly desires to better
him or herself. The military, at least, offers rehabilitation within the system. The
offender who has not been discharged may anticipate a return to the service after
completion of sentence. In practice, however, the shrinking size of the force
makes it unlikely that a convicted felon will be retained for a further enlistment.
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The military criminal justice system has improved over the years, but it
remains short of perfection. Nonetheless, it provides profitable areas of study in
criminal justice. I would not urge its complete adoption in the civilian sphere. ·
Each system should be tailored to the distinct constituencies it serves. I would
recommend that civilian systems examine features of the military system that have
worked well. Possibly, the lessons learned in the military can stimulate reform in
the civilian system, especially in those areas that demand improvement.
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